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1. Introduction 
Although the use of computer and communications technology 
in offices has been proclaimed as the major change in work 
settings anticipated during the 1980's [Bikson 81, Mankin 78) and 
it is predicted that over 50% of the the total work force will be 
affected [Bair 781, relatively little is known about the 
consequences of its adoption. This paper describes an 
exploratory study of integrated office technology in a commercial 
bank, with particular emphasis on the resulting changes in 
structure and content of office work. 
1.1. Background and Literature Review 
It is sometimes argued, as routine office work is 
transferred to computer systems, that the remaining jobs will 
have increased content, involve greater opportunities for 
learning and require higher levels of skill than 
previously [Shepard 77, Connell 791. Equally frequently it is 
suggested that use of this technology will result in deskilling 
of office jobs, for example, through increased specialization, or 
decreased autonomy and interaction with other workers [Braverman 
74, Gregory 831. Some point out that, with the introduction of 
technology, there is a tendency in capitalistic societies to 
reorganize work at lower levels of skill than before [Attewell 
821. Others note that effects are likely to be different for 
different job levels; routine clerical jobs will become deskilled 
while managerial jobs become enhanced, or the reverse. More 
recently it has been maintained that information technology is 
neutral; the values of its implementors and designers, and the 
social context in which it is employed determine the impacts on 
work organization [Olson 85, Kling 801. This last theme suggests 
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the importance of implementation in determining outcomes. 
There are various perspectives on implementation, each 
suggesting its own set of critical factors and issues. The most 
obvious is technological and economic determinism, where the 
character of the work is derived from the job to be done, the 
nature of the technology available and the structure of economic 
interests [Ginzberg 791. A second approach stresses contextual 
factors: environmental, organizational and cultural [Lucas 811. 
Another perspective, highlighting the process of implementation, 
focuses on political interests, 'turf' and the re-allocation of 
power among key actors [Keen 81, Markus 831. A fourth theme sees 
social systems and their patterns of norms, information flow and 
control as being dominant [Kling 841. 
Another interesting and somewhat related approach to 
implementation is provided by the innovation literature [Bikson 
811. The R&D model proposes an explicitly rational process 
leading from scientific inquiry to adoption and employment. 
Here, users needs are the goal of the innovation process. The 
problem-solving model has users needs as the starting point of 
the process. Innovation is seen as a problem-solving activity 
that "progresses from experienced and diagnosed needs, through 
information search and decision making, to trial and evaluation." 
Bikson concludes that innovation outcomes turn mainly on the 
"situational characteristics" of particular organizational 
contexts. Factors to be considered include: reason for adoption, 
involvement of key actors, incentives, adaptive planning, user 
participation, and training. 
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As Laudon [Laudon 851 observes, most explanations of 
implementation rely on either environmental or institutional 
models of organizational change. Environmental models consider 
exogenous uncertainties and opportunities which organizations 
must either cope with or take advantage of in order to survive. 
Institutional models, in contrast, focus on endogenous factors, 
which are partially under organizational control and are often 
the result of past actions, for example, organizational culture, 
the values of key stakeholders, or social structure. Laudon 
believes that organizations are driven to adopt information 
technology largely because of environmental factors. The extent 
to which information technology is actually utilized and the 
specific ways in which it is implemented is, however, determined 
mostly by institutional factors. 
These latter approaches have much in common. They conceive 
of outcomes as resulting from the interplay between the 
characteristics of the available technology, economic 
considerations, contextual factors, political realities and 
social pressures. It is this view of innovation that has been 
adopted for this study. 
One final theme needs mentioning. Most authors agree that 
office information systems should improve productivity, through 
reductions in cost or by improvements in worker 
performance [Poppel 821. Studies substantiating this notion, 
however, are rare. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-85-93 
1.2. Approach to the Study 
The general approach that has been taken in the study of 
office work is to describe what workers do in offices and then, 
based on the capabilities and characteristics of a particular 
technology, project the likely payoffs and consequences when they 
use that technology [Uhlig 79, Poppel 821. The difficulty with 
this strategy is that it assumes work will be organized in the 
same manner as before and that workers will be performing the 
same tasks. This need not be the case. The most important 
consequences of using technology in offices come through changes 
in the context of work and how it is structured, and may be 
unexpected. For this reason, more exploratory studies are needed 
to identify variables of interest, to formulate more precisely 
questions for further investigation and to raise policy issues. 
There have been relatively few studies of actual systems in 
real work settings. Those that have been made consist in either 
the evaluation of a specific product or the determination of how 
well the goals of an organization have been met [Matteis 
79, Uhlig 79, Crawford 821. These studies are often performed by 
the developers of the system themselves, raising questions of 
bias. 
Some work has been done in evaluating the i n d i v i d u a l  
components of office systems, for example text editing [Card 831 
or electronic mail [Crawford 821, treating them as though they 
were independent. Integrated office systems that provide a wide 
range of features, however, have not been studied in detail. 
Communications and information technology have been applied 
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to the following office functions: 
Internal mail 
External mail 
Text preparation 
Filing 
Information retrieval 
Conferencing 
Office applications, including scheduling, telephone and 
calendar management 
Decision support 
Access to operational application systems 
An integrated office system, then, would consist of all, or at 
least a large number of the above functions. 
While there is little agreement as to what the term 
integration constitutes, the suggestion is that it goes beyond 
multifunctionality to include: 
* The use of the same name, semantics and method of 
invocation for common functions among the parts of a 
system. For example, the command for saving a file 
would be the same in the mail sub-system as in text 
preparation, and the functions would be identical. 
* A product, worked on in one part of a system, is 
available in all others. 
* It is relatively easy to move among the parts of a 
system without taking special action. For example, one 
can move between mail and text preparation sub-systems 
without being concerned about saving a file, exiting 
from one sub-system and entering another. 
* Navigational information on status and location is 
provided. 
* The system is open-ended so that new functions or sub- 
systems can be added easily. 
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Consequently, an integrated office system provides a common 
interface to a wide variety of office functions and is, 
potentially, a more complete tool than any of the component 
parts. Thus, the effects should be more pronounced than those 
associated with any one of the parts. 
This study investigates the changes that have taken place in 
the Asia/Pacific Group of the Bankers Trust Company after the 
introduction of an integrated office system. Considerable 
attention is given to the process of implementation and to 
changes in outcomes. 
2 .  Method 
The boundary of the situation being studied includes one 
department of a major financial institution, consisting of about 
2000 employees, and those portions of other departments (mostly 
certain members of the Technology and Operations departments) 
that were directly involved in the system implementation. 
Geographically, the department is dispersed world wide with 
headquarters of about 60 in New York City, sharing the same 
building as the Corporate Executive, and with well over 60% of 
its staff permanently assigned to field offices in major 
financial centers around the world, the majority of them in Asia. 
Staff are routinely rotated back to New York for training and re- 
assignment. 
The unit of analysis for this study is the individual 
worker, although some conclusions are drawn about work group, 
departmental and organizational processes. 
Semi-structured interviews, memoranda and observations were 
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the primary method of data gathering. 
Respondents were selected from all levels of the department, 
ranging from clerical to department head, based upon their having 
participated in the implementation and their formal position in 
the organization. For purposes of verification, where possible, 
at least two subjects were selected from each work group and from 
each organizational role. Although the researcher was unable to 
travel abroad, a sufficient number of workers who had been in the 
field at the time of implementation were available in New York to 
not make this a limitation. 
An open ended interview selection process was used. If, in 
the course of an interview, a person was mentioned as having 
played a key role in the implementation, that name was added to 
the list of interviewees. The more senior personnel were 
interviewed last to permit the identification of critical policy 
issues. Table 2-1 provides a summary of respondents by 
organizational level. 
Interviews centered on five facets of work: 
* The process of implementation. The events that 
occurred and the role that the respondent played. 
* The technical system. The features used, purposes for 
which they were used and the respondent's attitudes 
about the system. 
* The job. The tasks performed, how these had changed 
from before the system was implemented and the likely 
causes of these changes. 
* Interactions with others. The ways in which 
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Table 2-1: Interviewees by Organizational Level 
Level Interviewees [number 1 
Organization 
Group 
Individual 
Department Executive [ 1 1 
Technology Department [ 3 1 
Heads [21 
Division Heads [ 1 1  
Team Heads [2] 
Key Actors [2] 
Officers [51 
Support [ 41  
Total [201 
interactions and relations with other workers, 
supervisors and principals had changed and the likely 
reasons for these changes. 
* Policy issues. Attitudes about issues that have 
potential policy overtones for workers, the use of this 
technology, or the bank. 
A copy of the interview protocol has been provided as Appendix I. 
Subjects were interviewed by the researcher, in sessions lasting 
from 30 to 60 minutes with the last portion devoted to 
unstructured items, either those that the respondent cared to 
raise or amplification of items that emerged during the 
interview. They were conducted from October 1984 through June 
1985. 
Informal feedback sessions were held with selected 
individuals and groups to assure that conclusions reached in the 
analysis were realistic. 
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3. Study Setting 
Bankers Trust Company, with approximately 45 billion dollars 
in total assets, ranks as the country's seventh largest 
commercial bank employing some 10,400 people, world-wide. 
Several years ago, Bankers Trust embarked on a strategy to shift 
the emphasis of their business from retail to wholesale financial 
services, prompting them to withdraw from certain businesses, 
such as retail banking, that did not fit this new image. 
3.1. Corporate Strategy 
In refining their wholesale financial services strategy, 
- Bankers Trust made return on average common equity (ROE) their 
primary financial target, partially because it permits 
comparisons with non-bank financial companies. Bankers Trust's 
current goal is a ROE of $20 on each $100 of common 
equity [Bankers 841. In 1984, the return was $16.20, up from 
$16.16 in 1983 [Bankers 841. Stockholders equity increased to 
$2.1 billion, up from $1.6 billion in 1983 and 1.4 billion in 
1982 [Bankers 841. Since 1977, equity has grown by more than 
$1.3 billion, largely through high earnings performance, by 
judiciously taking advantage of capital market opportunities and 
through decisions consistent with their wholesale strategy. The 
continued growth in equity reflects the belief that capital 
strength is indispensable for successful competition in the 
wholesale financial services industry. 
Along with the emphasis on equity has come an intense effort 
to control non-interest expense while maintaining a commitment to 
operating quality. Over the past six years, growth of operating 
expense has increased at an average annual rate of 11%, as 
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compared with 16% for a composite of the nine largest commercial 
banks in the United States. Several tactics have been 
responsible for maintaining this downward pressure on expenses, 
among them, the controlled application of technology, 
particularly in labor intensive areas, and the institution of an 
internal expense budgeting system. The latter links all expenses 
directly to related revenue streams, clarifying the selection of 
trade-offs when managing expense growth. Through this system, 
internal expenses between departments are billed directly to user 
departments, just as outside vendors would bill them. 
Consequently, ultimate accountability for expense control rests 
with income producing user groups, which have clear incentives to 
decrease unproductive expenses and to increase productive ones. 
The third component of Bankers Trust's approach has been to 
manage credit exposure by pricing that compensates for the degree 
of risk taken. In 1983, the ratio of net charge-offs to average 
loans fell to .20%, down from . 4 5 %  in 1982 [Bankers 831. 
Moreover, the allowance for loan losses has increased and now 
stands at 1.5% of total loans [Bankers 841. 
The ongoing refinement of Bankers Trust's wholesale strategy 
has led to a new sort of financial institution - a world-wide 
merchant bank, meeting customer needs with innovative, 
sophisticated and profitable services. The merchant banking 
strategy seeks to combine on-balance-sheet lending capabilities 
and breadth of non-credit services of a commercial bank with 
intermediary skills, flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit of an 
investment bank. 
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Trading strength and the ability to distribute securities 
and financial instruments are the cornerstone of merchant 
banking. Bankers Trust is one of the five largest primary U.S. 
government securities dealers, as well as one of the five leaders 
among bankers acceptance dealers. They also rank in the top six 
investment banks in the commercial paper field. Last year marked 
the emergence of BT Futures Corp, a separate entity offering its 
customers institutional hedging and trading techniques using 
futures and options on futures, in the interest rate, currency 
and precious metals markets. 
3.2. Corporate Culture 
In contrast to their innovative approach to competition in 
financial markets and their aggressive change in corporate 
direction, Bankers Trust remains a conservative company that will 
not take action unless it can see a clear benefit. It is a 
company that doesn't take a risk unless it is coupled with 
definable and appropriate rewards. While new blood has been 
brought in from Wall street and amply rewarded, the majority of 
the staff are bankers operating under the old rules. It is this 
conflict between risk taking and risk aversion that is reflected 
through out the company and gives it part of its schizophrenic 
character. 
Individuals appear competent. Yet, the potential for the 
organization, taken as a whole, seems greater than what is 
achieved in practice. Much of what is done at middle and 
operational levels is not directed at accomplishing business 
goals. There seems to be an unusual amount of difficulty in 
translating goals, articulated from the top, into programs that 
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have the support of those in the middle and at the bottom. 
Individual workers often tend to be myopic; they have difficulty 
taking an organizational prospective. 
3.3. ~nternational Department 
The International Department (ID) was one of the three 
groups that made up the Banking Function, the other two being the 
U.S. Department (banking services for non-multinationals) and 
World Corporate (banking services for  multinational^)^. ID was 
organized geographically, by regions, with four main groups: 
Asia/Pacific, Latin America/Canada, Europe, and Middle 
East/Africa. Also part of the department were four service 
groups: Trade Banking (letters of credit and collections), 
Syndication, IRMD (international risk management and credit 
reviews), and Individual Investment Management. For the most 
part, ID was organized with a regional manager, then a senior 
country officer with front office, back office and operations 
support. Although day to day direction came from ID, the 
organization structure was matrixed with service groups also 
reporting to their functional parent elsewhere in the company. 
l ~ e c e n t l ~  Bankers Trust reorganized, grouping together 
departments that have significant potential for improving return 
on equity and they intend to expand aggressively as part of their 
overall merchant banking strategy. The previous head of the 
International Department emerged as head of the Global Processing 
and Information Services Department (GOIS) which performs deposit 
services, funds transfer, trade payment and collection services 
on a world-wide basis. 
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3.4. The Asia/Pacific Group 
As part of ID, the Asia/Pacific Group (approximately 300 
staff) provided commercial banking services in Asia and the Far 
13ast2. The group was organized geographically including: 
* North Division with headquarters in Hong Kong and 
offices in Korea, Taiwan, The Peoples Republic of China 
and the Philippines. 
* South Division with headquarters in Singapore and 
representatives in Bombay, Jakarta, Bangkok and 
Colombo. 
* Japan Division with headquarters and office in Tokyo. 
* New York Division with headquarters in New York and 
consisting of five teams (desks): Japan, Korea, North, 
South and London. The purpose of these teams was to 
coordinate activities originating in New York with 
their respective field offices and to to link the field 
offices with the appropriate Operations groups in New 
York. 
* Two subsidiaries, BTAL located in Sydney and TISCO in 
Bangkok. 
* Group Credit and Controller staff functions. 
The organization chart is shown in Figure 3-1. 
2 ~ n  the recent reorganization, the Asia/Pacific Group became 
part of the Latin Arnerica/Asia Pacific Department of the 
Commercial Banking Function. The old head of the Asia/Pacific 
Group has become the deputy head of the new Latin America/Asia 
Pacific Department. 
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Figure 3-1: Organization Chart for the Asia/Pacific Group 
3.5. Technology ~epartment 
Most of the information systems personnel in the bank, 
roughly 800, were part of the Computer Systems Department (CSD) 
which consisted of a variety of groups developing and maintaining 
most of the bank's computer application systems or running their 
data centers3. CSD1s reputation was going through the same type 
of negative image as were many centralized computer departments 
in large companies. It was viewed as a traditional COBOL shop; 
builders of large, transaction processing systems that were often 
3~ntil recently, CSD reported to Banking Operations, but about 
a year and a half ago the name of the department was changed to 
the Technology Department (TD) and it now reports at the same 
level as the other major operating units (to the Executive 
Committee). 
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behind schedule, over budget and not particularly responsive to 
user needs. Yet, as with many similar departments, they were, in 
their own way, innovators. One of these groups, Information 
Management Services ( IMS) , built the system4. 
4. Asia/Pacific Group's Business Problem 
Almost all of the Asia/Pacific Group's communication, both 
between New York and the field, and among field offices took 
place over BITS, the Bankers Trust International TELEX System. 
TELEX was used because of the need for a hard copy record of the 
communication on both ends and because time differences 
restricted greatly the concurrent availability of parties for 
telephone conversations during the normal business day. 
TELEX preparation involved a principal dictating a message 
to a secretary or giving her handwritten copy. The secretary 
would then type the message and give it back to the principal for 
correction. This process was repeated until an error free 
message was created. The secretary then prepared a TELEX tape 
for each recipient. Copy from each of these tapes was given to 
the principal for approval after which the secretary actually sat 
down at the TELEX and transmitted each message. 
Not only did this process consume a lot of a principal's and 
the secretary's time, but it was inefficient, error prone and it 
4 ~ h e  IMS Division has been reorganized and is now called 
Bankers Trust Information Services (BTIS). The system is no 
longer their responsibility, but instead has been placed under a 
new entity, in TD, Corporate Information and Communications 
Systems. 
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discouraged sending messages and information copies, just the 
behavior opposite of what was desired when putting together a 
complicated deal where timing and coordination were critical. 
Frequently, secretaries were required to work overtime just to 
send messages and principals arranged their daily schedules to 
insure there would be sufficient time to send messages before the 
end of the day. 
Another task involved the need to generate long (15-20 page) 
loan proposals that had to be sent between Tokyo, Hong Kong, New 
York and London several times during their preparation. 
While it is not clear that the problem was perceived in 
exactly these terms at its inception, almost everyone believes 
now that this was the primary reason for going forward with the 
5 system . 
5. Office Information System (01s) 
The possibility of using computer and communications 
technology to overcome the communications problem in ID, in 
general, and for the Asia/Pacific Group, in particular, did not 
escape the heads of the departments. ID was profitable and its 
head, a forceful executive, with lots of ideas and a willingness 
to put money behind them, was interested in things that might 
 an^ more functions were included in the system than can be 
explained solely on the basis of improving communications. 
Clearly, then, some players intended that the system be used for 
purposes other than communication, for example, to improve the 
quality of information available, or to alter the content of 
jobs, or to change the location of where work was performed, etc. 
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make them more profitable. He realized the opportunities 
presented by computer and communications technology and decided 
to take advantage of them. The wholesale banking strategy rested 
on cultivating relationships with the most profitable clients, 
devoting a great deal of effort, for example, to lending and 
deposit taking. Key to this were representatives in the field 
being able to craft new and exciting products for their clients 
and obtaining close support from Operations units and Executive 
Management, in New York, that would have to approve a deal. 
Technology could also become a symbol of BT's new, aggressive 
posture. 
The head of the Asia/Pacific group knew that poor 
communications was compromising his people's performance and his 
ability to control them. As he put it later: 
If you are charged with the responsibility for managing 
a business that covers fifteen countries, the problems of 
coordination and communication are of real concern and 
very crucial to your success. OIS provides us with just 
the kind of communications link we need to tie together 
our operation. 
There were fewer champions within CSD. A study had shown 
that Office Automation should be investigated in detail and the 
head of IMS was looking for a customer, within the bank, to pilot 
test an office system. ID showed the most interest of the 
potential user departments within the bank. There had been 
several attempts at office systems in the past, but none of them 
had sufficient support to be funded. There was general awareness 
in CSD t at the bank was not taking advantage of new technology 
and might be left behind. 
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5.1. Design Objectives and Implementation Strategy 
Initially, it was thought that communicating word processors 
in each location could handle the job. But the head of ID felt 
this was too limited an approach. From the beginning, Office 
Information System (01s) was intended to be integrated, providing 
a variety of functions, for example, internal and external mail 
coupled with text preparation, to solve the communications 
problem, and to access the banks application systems as a way of 
delivering information directly to people in the field without 
having to go through middlemen. As conceived, the system would 
be a vital tool for the working level, but less essential for 
6 senior management . In order to ensure that the system worked 
before being given to users in ID, IMS would pre-pilot test the 
system in its own department. 
The concern over controlling expenses meant that the pilot 
had to be tied to clear cut goals and success factors. For 
example, the purpose of the pilot was: 
to demonstrate that the system is: 
* A means for increasing hard-dollar revenue 
* A catalyst for behavioral change 
* A means of improving internal and external communications 
* Financially justifiable in terms of cost savings 
* Technologically effective 
60ne of the original proposals was that the system should be 
used by only the head of ID and the 8 senior managers reporting 
to him - essentially an executive support system. This plan was 
discarded in favor of the approach described, which was much more 
broadly based, providing support to staff at all levels - 
operatives to executives. 
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The category of 'behavioral change' requires explanation. 
The culture at the bank made it particularly difficult to alter 
people's behavior. There were no easy mechanisms for making 
people aware of the need for change7. For example, if TELEXs 
were sent out in the afternoon, then it was almost impossible to 
change this pattern short of a directive from top management. It 
was realized by some of the players in ID (but not all) that OIS 
could be used as a vehicle for "discarding some of the bad habits 
formed over time." 
More specific goals in customer service, for example, were 
"respond to 30% of customer Money Transfer Inquiries from Bankers 
Trust field locations on the same day that the inquiry is made 
without reference to Money Transfer Research in new York." 
Another goal was to "remove Asia/Pacific Group's New York 
division Customer Service Officer (CSO) from all routine customer 
inquiries coming from the field." 
To accomplish this, OIS was to provide a direct line to the 
setup and inquiry functions of the Historic Research system (HR). 
A CSO in an overseas office would be able to respond to customer 
requests for information on the same day they were made by using 
their OIS terminal to view full details of the transaction. If 
desired, a research process could be initiated immediately with 
HR routing the request to a researcher, thereby shortening the 
process by two days. 
7~chein [Schein 701  refers to this preparatory stage as 
'unfreezing'. 
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Other goals included implementing ID'S "close to the 
customer" strategy and building a data base to assist 
Relationship Managers in identifying customer needs, in 
developing and monitoring market plans, and in permitting Product 
Managers to assess requirements/applicability across units. The 
time required to complete a loan proposal requiring group level 
approval was to be reduced by 50% (the current process took 10 
days). The overall time required to complete inter-office 
communication was to be reduced by 30 minutes (from 40 to 10 
minutes). Finally, the OIS pilot test was to reduce the amount 
of time marketing personnel spend on administrative matters by 
15%, eliminate 25% of New York based CSO's problem solving work 
load and replace it by customer contact, and reduce secretarial 
workload allowing improvements in their officer coverage ratio8 
from .33 to .25, or a 33% improvement. 
Just prior to the pilot test, a three month average of BITS 
traffic going in and out of New York was 159 messages per day and 
this was growing at about 10% per year. One of the notions was 
that OIS would be a substitute for BITS and this traffic would 
decrease. 
5 . 2 .  System Description 
IMS wanted to build the system out of proven technology. 
After a through evaluation of the available products they 
selected Digital Equipment Corporation's (DEC) All-in-One Office 
Menu System, which was in prototype testing at the time. The 
*officer coverage ratio is the number of secretaries in a group 
divided by the number of officers (principals) in the group. 
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system runs on VAXs under VMS and includes word processing; 
electronic mail; document processing; desk management, with 
calendar and calculation; and forms development in one integrated 
package. The system consists of three components: a flow control 
facility to allow a VT-100 terminal to select options from a menu 
to move from one application to another, an application interface 
providing menu access to an application, and a forms development 
capability for adding new applications. One of the reasons for 
selecting All-in-One was the communications architecture of the 
VAX . 
Figure 5-1 shows the equipment configuration. Two 
Figure 5-1: OIS Equipment Configuration 
Eua)r 4& 
'm- 
VAX-11/780s, located at BT Plaza, running VMS are connected with 
a highspeed communications link (DECNET). One system had three 
spindles of disk storage (256MB each) while the other system had 
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two. Both systems are DECNETed to BTShare, the time sharing 
system, and run 3270 and 3780 emulation to connect to the bank's 
IBM-370 computers. There is a DECNET link to another VAX running 
the Historical Research system and a Telenet line to a PDP-11 
running the Cash Connector system. A 72 line statistical 
multiplexor (STAT MUX) tied to a micro-wave link is used to 
connect the equipment at BT Plaza to 280 Park Avenue, where ID is 
located, and dial-up access allows other non-DEC terminals, such 
as MICOMs and hard copy devices, to communicate with the system. 
OIS runs on one of the VAXs while the other is used for back-up 
or development. Terminal transmission speeds are 9600 baud at BT 
Plaza, 2400 baud at 280 Park Avenue, and 1200 baud over BTNet 
overseas and dial-up. A Teltone MODEM is used to split the phone 
line in an office into voice and data reducing installation cost 
greatly. 
Functionally, OIS consisted of: 
* ~lectronic Mail (EM): Creating, editing, reading, 
sending, answering, forwarding, and return receipt. 
Mailing lists and BITS outbound. Electronic filing and 
retrieval. 
* Word Processing (WP): Creating and editing. 
* Administrative Office Aids: Spelling checker, file 
folder, waste basket, reports, and change password. 
Tickler, calendar, spreadsheet, graphics, datatrieve, 
autodialer, phone directory, and calculator. 
* Access to Other Systems: BTShare, Cash Connector 
(transactions for each customer), Commercial Loan, 
Historical Research, WIS File Cabinet, TSO, Financial 
Asset Inventory System (FAIS), and Automated Competitor 
Intelligence System (ACIS). 
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Not all of these functions are currently implemented. BT has 
enhanced All-in-One by adding various features including output 
queues, usage statistics, database reorganization, file folder 
features, guest privileges, and a pc option. 
5.3. Implementation Schedule 
Planning for OIS started in the spring of 1982. Equipment 
was installed in New York during the summer and the pre-pilot 
started with IMS. Equipment was installed in the field, 
beginning in November and lasting through the beginning of 1983. 
At that time pilot testing commenced. 
The identification of goals and success criteria for the 
pilot occurred during the winter of 1983 and evaluation continued 
through 1983 and into the beginning of 1984. In June 1984, a 
decision was made to use a scaled back version of the system that 
emphasized EM and reduced cost for all of ID. During 1984, usage 
began to expand, unofficially, beyond ID, and this continued 
until 1985, when the system was expanded, officially, bank wide. 
There are some 200 users in Asia/Pacific now out of 800 users 
bank wide. 
5.4. Cost 
OIS cost about 1.6 million dollars, per year, without 
international telecommunications. This includes equipment, 
software development and support. When the system was scaled 
back in functionality (June 1984), costs were reduced to about 
950K per year. With the expansion of OIS, bank wide, costs have 
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risen to about 1.4 million per year9 
6 ,  How OIS is Used 
OIS is used in different ways, in ID, by different types of 
employees, depending upon whether they are located in the field 
or in New York. Part of the philosophy behind the system is that 
everyone will prepare, send and receive their own messages. 
In the field, OIS is used mostly for communications and for 
word processing. Officers read their mail first thing in the 
morning and prepare their own replies. They may check the system 
3-4 times additionally during the day. When people from New York 
are traveling, they tend to use the system heavily from field 
locations. The reduced number of terminals overseas, however, 
limits access to the system and people have to wait often for a 
terminal. Speed of the lines and the need for certain of the 
Operations offices in New York to be open in order to use on-line 
files restricts the usefulness of the connection to the 
application systems. Many people don't know or have forgotten 
how to use features other than EM and WP. 
Secretaries make extensive use of WP and EM. Larger 
documents are prepared off-line on DECMates, listed out for 
proofing, corrections are entered and then the documents are 
transmitted over 01s. The low speed lines and high transmission 
costs restrict use of the system interactively. 
9~urrently, the average monthly cost per user is about $145, 
based on 800 users. 
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In New York, almost everyone in Asia/Pacific has their own 
VDT terminal which, along with the higher speed lines, encourages 
use. People send and receive their own mail (there is 
considerably higher traffic rates in New York because of the 
greater connectivity and bandwidth) and also does much of their 
own document preparation. Officers and support staff make 
extensive use of connections to other systems, directly accessing 
the Commercial Loan, Cash Connector and Historical Research 
systems instead of contacting the respective operations offices 
on the phone. Secretaries have a VDT terminal next to their 
desks (along with their typewriter) and there are hooded draft 
and letter quality printers scattered about the offices, usually 
in the center of a room. Occasionally, two secretaries will 
share a terminal which will be placed mid-way between their 
desks. 
An active officer in New York might be continuously logged 
in to the system, receiving 10-15 messages a day and transmitting 
7-10. Meetings may take place around a terminal while someone 
pages through a document or a list on the screen. Some of the 
officers use OIS to gain access to BTShare where they execute an 
analytic procedure they have written and route the output back to 
the terminal or to a printer. A spread sheet function is used 
for preparing plans; it can be down loaded to a pc or work on a 
pc can up loaded into 01s. 
A person is charged for the functions used. Basic OIS, 
which includes EM and WP, is billed at about $100 per month. 
Extended features, including advanced office aids and access to 
other systems (BTShare, TSO, and the bank's operational systems) 
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costs another $40, for a total of $140. A department decides 
what features of the system an employee is entitled to use and 
IMS charges the department accordingly. 
7. What has Changed 
7.1. Job Content and Skill Level 
The content of secretaries jobs have clearly improved, in 
terms of the variety of the work and the level of skills 
required, although their grade level or relative compensation 
have not changed. It used to be that a secretary would send 40 
TELEXs a day. This meant spending 2-3 hours in the TELEX room 
and many more hours in preparation, Now principals send most of 
their own messages. Because not all offices have OIS, some 
TELEXs still have to be sent, but this is much easier with OIS's 
ability to send outgoing TELEX messages. The message is drafted 
in OIS (often by the principal) and then sent out as a TELEX. 
The secretaries typing load has been reduced, consisting 
mainly of larger manuscripts now. This has freed time for other 
activities: some customer contact, some research, and better 
service to their principals. The WP has permitted creating more 
"professional" looking work. Some secretaries feel also that the 
total amount of paper has decreased, especially with the 
Electronic Filing Cabinet. Many principals, however, still 
request hard copy from the system to take home, carry with them 
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on trips, or just to put in their own fileslo. Many feel that 
the paper files have not decreased in size. 
The secretaries are very positive about the system. They 
feel that they have acquired new skills and that they are more 
productive than before. There are fewer interruptions and they 
are better able to concentrate on their work. They feel more "in 
touch'' with their principal's work and they actively seek to 
solve problems. As one secretary put it, "you don't have to wait 
for the paper to come to you, you just pull it up on the system." 
They are proud that management has seen fit to invest in better 
tools for them; it makes them feel important. Many have 
decorated or personalized their terminals and one of the 
secretaries sends messages over the system in the form of 
Christmas trees at holiday time. 
Another way the system has benefited secretaries is by 
opening a new career path. One secretary, who showed an unusual 
interest in and skill with the system, was promoted to be the 
local system "expert" who provided consultation and teaching to 
l01t appears that certain people are much more willing than 
others to give up their hard copy records. Speculating, one 
might expect this to be a function of how secure an individual 
felt in his position and how easy it was for them to build a 
cognitive model of their work when they used the system. 
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others in the Asia/Pacif ic Group's New York headquarters1'. She 
has transferred to TD and now mans the OIS Help desk, world wide, 
from her location in Asia/Pacific. This transfer did result in a 
positive grade and salary change and the incumbent believes that 
she has many more career options now than she had before. She 
likes her role because it permits her to meet and talk with many 
different people, It gives her an opportunity to teach something 
(rather than being taught). 
Management appears not to have anticipated the change in 
work mix for the secretaries and there has been little direction 
as to how their role should evolve. Each secretary has been left 
on their own to work this out as best they can. In Tokyo, for 
example, one of the secretaries got heavily involved in 
administrative work, while in New York there has been relatively 
little change in the content of the secretaries job (with the 
exception of reduced TELEX preparation and transmission). 
Some managers feel that the system helps them establish 
priorities in their work. For example, by looking at who sent 
messages and their subjects (using the "scan" function) the 
important messages can be selected first. Another manager 
''part of the implementation strategy for the project was to 
have a 'coordinatorf at each location who would serve as a 
contact person and be available for special assistance to the 
remainder of the workers at the site. These were mostly 
officers, selected on the basis of their being the most qualified 
to do the job (and a willingness to serve in the role). They 
received no change in grade or salary, but did receive somewhat 
more detailed training. 
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believes he is better aware of "what is going on in Asia." There 
is more of a tendency now to inform people because it is a lot 
easier to send a carbon copy. 
7.2. Structural Arrangements 
Although there have been no major changes in structure or 
social support, the system has facilitated social interaction 
among levels. Since the secretaries were often trained in the 
first group, they became the most knowledgable and experienced 
users on the system. If a person missed the formal training 
session the easiest way for them to learn about the system was to 
be taught by junior officers that had become skilled or by 
secretaries. As a result, the system became a vehicle for 
interaction among the staff; it served to break down some of the 
barriers that exist, particularly in the field. 
7.3. Communication 
As shown in Table 7-1, TELEX outgoing messages decreased 
after OIS was installed. In the three months prior to OIS, BITS 
traffic for the Asia/Pacific group averaged 159 messages per day 
(with a s.d. of 7.6). In the same period a year later, BITS 
message traffic averaged 69 messages per day (s.d.= 4.9), a 
decrease of 57%. Prior to this, BITS traffic for the group had 
been growing at about 10% a year. This suggests that part of OIS 
traffic substituted for BITS. 
Principals believe that the system has cut down on the 
number of telephone calls and distributed memos, especially in 
New York. Messages on the system tend to be brief; frequently 
one or two screens. People feel more productive. They try one 
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Table 7-1: Asia/Pacific Group Daily Message Traffic 
Month BITS X s.d. 0 3  
1982 Sep 
Oc t 
Nov 
Dec 
1983 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
A P ~  
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
SeP 
Oc t 
Nov 
Note: BITS outgoing messages have been adjusted by a factor 
of 1.4 to make them comparable to the way OIS messages are counted. 
phone call (probably because it is faster than typing the message 
and they don't have to interrupt what they are doing to sign-on 
to the system) and, if they aren't able to get their party, they 
send a message over the system knowing it will be read by the end 
of the day. The new tool provides them with alternatives that 
permit accomplishing sub-goals. Some reports are distributed 
over the system instead of being sent around as hard copy ("you 
don't have to use the 'pouch' as much now"). For example, the 
Monthly Profitability System (MPS) used in planning took several 
days to distribute. Now it is loaded into OIS and delivered by 
EM. Most people agree that more information is available now and 
it is easier to obtain than before 01s. Part of this undoubtedly 
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results from the ease of sending copies over 01s. Some analyses 
are prepared on a Rainbow or IBM pc and then up-loaded into OIS 
for distribution. 
Several people observed that the English of employees, where 
English was not their native tongue, improved after they began 
creating and reading their own messages using 01s. 
The amount of trivial messages have also increased, however, 
and much of the communication is between officers on the same 
level, for example, among junior officers, rather than among 
levels that would enhance information flow up and down the 
hierarchy. And, for certain people, the system has served as an 
excuse not to get get out in the field to find out what is really 
going on, or to meet with customers. As one officer said, "it is 
easy to become mesmerized by the screen." There is concern on 
the part of some operatives that management will see everything 
"through the machine" and will not get out in the field to make 
their presence felt. 
Another put the concern about content this way, "when you 
are out of the office a lot of messages build up and that is when 
you can really see the trivia. So many people send messages I 
don't need to see." Some officers feel that the system has 
contributed to their "overload." Another observed that there is 
a tendency to "bullshit" and that the truth is usually a little 
less than appears on the screen. 
Several principals noted that there is a tendency to be more 
"casual" on the system. People say things on the system they 
might not put in a memo. They are more relaxed and may interject 
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a few jokes or put in samples of conversation with a customer. 
Memos, at Bankers Trust, seem to be more formal than in many 
other organizations; they are associated with reports. 
Several managers felt that the return receipt feature is 
useful because it becomes harder for people to say they didn't 
receive a document. 
Almost everyone agreed that in times of great pressure or 
emergency, people revert to their old methods of doing work. 
They tend to pick up the phone and they may not read their EM for 
several days. It becomes a "pain" to log in and people get up so 
they can "physically" do something. With urgent items there 
appears to be comfort in having "paper copy. *I 
7 . 4 .  Work ~ocation 
As a result of the system some work has shifted to the field 
with resulting efficiencies. It used to be that everything was 
sent to New York for entry into the bank's operational systems. 
Now some of the data entry is done from the field offices. The 
reduction in transmittal time makes these systems more current, 
the error detection/correction cycle is shortened and the work 
does not "bunch up" in New York as it did before. Also, source 
documents do not hay:e to be transported and it reduces copying. 
Other, more subtle, changes have taken place. In the past, 
an officer from the field would call the New York CSO who would 
work with Operations, downtown, to resolve the problem and then 
communicate with the field. Now. people in the field work 
directly with Operations and there is less of a need for the 
csos . 
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There appear to have been few changes in where the "big" 
things are handled. The field still makes all of the deals and 
key decisions; approvals come from New York. 
7.5. Supervision and Performance Measures 
Supervisors say they feel more comfortable moving people 
because the system is a common element in all of the Asia/Pacific 
offices. The system has resulted in some standardization (of 
equipment and procedures) making staff more interchangeable. 
Some workers believe that the system contributes positively to 
supervision because it is easier to communicate with their 
supervisor and to keep them informed of what they are doing by 
sending copies of their work. People appear to be positive about 
having their work more "visible" to a supervisor. Possibly, this 
is because some workers are located remotely from their 
supervisors and believe that they don't really know what they are 
doing. The supervisors do not believe that the system has made 
it easier to supervise, except that they do feel better informed 
about what is going on in the bank. 
7.6. Power 
In some respects the system has raised the importance of the 
secretaries, due to their familiarity with it. As the system 
became an accepted "tool" serving a recognized, useful purpose, 
those people most knowledgable about it were swept along into 
more prominent roles. Whether this is lasting or not remains to 
be shown. To the extent association with the system, in this 
environment, is viewed as improving one's stature as a banker, 
the effect should be positive. If the system is perceived as a 
technological "toy", then association could be detrimental. It 
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is not clear that the "key" players have moved forward as a 
result of their role in advocating the system and in its 
implementation. 
7.7. Employment Levels 
The number of secretaries has decreased, for example, from 
11 in the New York office to 7 now. There have been smaller 
reductions in the field, Principals now believe they need less 
secretarial support, partially because the secretary to principal 
ratio has decreased. There have been no employment changes at 
the CSO, principal, or management levels in Asia/Pacific as a 
result of the system. Several new positions have been created in 
IMS to support the system and to staff the 'help' function. 
7.8. Performance and Cost 
Although it is difficult to quantify, the feeling is that 
there has been an increase in individual productivity and more 
communication with customers. The bank's competitiveness has 
increased. A one day turn-around on approvals for certain 
proposals has made the bank more responsive to their customers. 
As one officer put it, "we're definitely going in the right 
direction on the bottom line." Communications has really 
improved within the bank and there is more "connectivity." 
Another said, "it is worth the effort and the cost in ease and 
efficiency." 
Another manager pointed out that the system permits him more 
time flexibility. He can now do work from his home or hotel room 
and he doesn't have to spend as much time on the telephone. It 
is now possible to send others the outline of a report and then 
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converse with them over the details. Documents can be exchanged 
back and forth between Hong Kong and New York with each person 
editing and adding to them. This is done quite frequently. 
OIS has not had as much of an effect as was anticipated on 
either quantifiable performance measures or the "bottom line." 
Application systems were not sufficiently accessible from the 
field to permit an assessment of labor or cost savings in 
restructuring work flow. "Relationship" management1*, as a 
concept, never caught on, largely because it required forms to be 
filled out and "call" reports to be filed by field personnel. 
While OIS would have made controlling and maintaining this data 
easier than manual methods, not going forward with the 
relationship management idea removed one of the reasons for the 
"extended function" portion of the system. 
While the time to complete a loan proposal was reduced, this 
did not necessarily contribute to making more or better loans. 
Marketing personnel have not reduced the time they spend on 
administrative matters and CSOs still handle most of the contact 
with the field. While the potential to alter these relations has 
been shown, the implications have not been fully evaluated or 
changes institutionalized. 
The head of Asia/Pacific attributes some portion of the 
improvement in performance of his division between 1984 and the 
12~elationship management was a strategy to improve the data 
the bank had on key clients. Its goal was to permit some forward 
planning on the relationship with clients, rather than to have 
these come about by chance. 
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prior year (a 35% increase in revenue and a 60% increase in after 
tax income) to OIS, but it is difficult to apportion the amount. 
Most of the contribution appears to have been in improved 
communication and coordination among departments. 
OIS is a sophisticated system that will not be fully cost 
justified on EM alone, unless the complete bank is served. Other 
features, particularly access to application systems, must also 
be used. This implies fundamental changes to work processes, 
operational procedures and systems. This will take considerable 
additional investment of time and money. 
8. ~mplementation of OIS 
For the implementation of OIS, IMS hired a person, who had 
experience in bringing up a similar system for another financial 
institution, to play a key role in the project. They also 
retained a consultant well known in Office Systems to assist them 
in identifying potential problems and to aid in planning the 
implementation. The two stage pilot test, first with IMS itself 
and then with Asia/Pacific, gave them ample opportunity to debug 
the communications equipment, software and to configure the 
system. In a way, this approach could be considered a form of 
'prototyping.' 
A well respected member of Asia/Pacific, who had been 
involved in the initial feasibility study, was selected as the 
user representative on the implementation team. He devoted full 
time to the project during the pilot phase. 
The original concept was that four officers would share a 
terminal in the field. This didn't work well and the feeling now 
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is that a terminal should be placed in each office. Another part 
of the concept was that there would be one-on-one training, 
behind closed doors, to facilitate learning without embarrassing 
the person involved. One of the tactics used by IMS in 
implementing OIS was to designate an on-site person as the 
resident OIS "expert" in each office. This person received more 
intensive training and became a "friendly" source of information 
for the remainder of the area. 
While there was some "cultural" resistance to the system in 
the field, at the more senior levels, this was only in the short 
run and disappeared as soon as it became apparent the "boss" was 
using the system. The Japanese and Koreans were most resistant, 
while the Chinese took to it easily. As one officer put it, "it 
helped if you could type." The culture in New York was never a 
problem. As one senior executive said, "bank culture was that 
'real' men don't type. In this situation, the power of 
technology overcame the culture of the bank." 
Special care was taken to have documentation prepared and to 
provide training sessions on the equipment. While this was 
effective in getting people to learn the system and overcoming 
apprehension, some, especially after they had experience using 
the system, felt it was "overkill" by the people in New York. 
The staging of people using the system (transfers, not being 
selected for the first part of the pilot, initial skepticism, 
etc.) meant that a good portion of the staff were trained by 
their colleagues, rather than in the formal sessions. The 
simplicity of the system and its self-help features made it easy 
for many of the staff to learn on their own. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-85-93 
The system has been quite stable and available. One weekend 
a number of messages were lost, but outside of this the system 
has performed well. If trouble does arise, the local experts are 
notified and they go around to the remainder of the staff to let 
them know what is happening. The main system is heavily loaded 
now and people are beginning to complain about the slow response 
time . 
The difficulties experienced have been with the 
telecommunications portion of the system, particularly overseas. 
There have been problems getting lines in Japan and with the 
Telecommunications Authority in Singapore, where the parameters 
of the system were changed without notification. A direct line 
from Korea to New York was put in and that improved things. Some 
of the difficulties were "jurisdictional" within the company, 
particularly between the project and the Communications 
Department. 
8.1. Expectations 
Many managers think the system is "great." Their 
expectations were predicated on their prior experience. The 
system was sold to Asia/Pacific as having a large number of 
features and since electronic computers operate "at the speed of 
light" their expectations were high. In practice, in the field, 
it operated more slowly than they expected (largely because of 
communications difficulties). This affected the attractiveness 
of some of the features, for example, connections to the 
application systems. 
Some other managers did not have positive expectations for 
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the system initially. The value of the system did not become 
apparent to them for 6 months. At first, they used the system 
through intermediaries, but this proved much less efficient than 
when they used it themselves and this practice has disappeared. 
These managers are generally satisfied now. 
8.2. Reasons for Outcomes 
One of the major reasons for the implementation success was 
top management support. The heads of ID and the head of 
Asia/Pacific used the system. As one middle level manager put 
it, "when you called (the head of ID) his secretary would say, 
'1'11 have him call you back.' But he was too busy. If you 
wanted to get a message to him, you had to send it over the 
system. At least I knew he would read it by the end of the day.'' 
Another manager observed, "Those people who use it 
frequently have lots good to say for the machine; infrequent 
users are generally against it." 
8.3. Suggestions for Improvement 
Most people feel it would be extremely helpful if incoming 
TELEXs could be received through the system. Then they would be 
dealing with one device for all of their written communication. 
One of the most important benefits of the system is access 
to the various application systems, for example the Historical 
Record of Money Transfers, Commercial Loans or Collections. 
People at the operational level, particularly, believe these 
should be expanded and approached in a serious manner if the bank 
is to gain some of the real benefits from office technology - 
those that occur from changes in the allocation of tasks among 
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workers and in the location of where tasks are performed. 
Use of leased lines and satellite communications could 
increase bandwidth and make the system much more usable in the 
field. This would also decrease the primary source of errors. 
Improvements in performance overseas could be obtained if there 
were local processors (VAX/ll-725s or microVAXs) in major 
regions, for example, London and Tokyo. This would reduce 
traffic on the relatively slow transoceanic links. It would also 
be beneficial to upgrade the capacity and reliability of all of 
the telecommunications links outside of the U.S., especially 
those that rely on Telenet. Of course, considerable additional 
investment would be required. 
The secretaries observe that the printers are noisy and 
disturbing. Most locations have some form of sound suppression 
enclosure for the printers. Several people were knowledgable 
enough to observe that in future configurations, consideration 
should be given to laser/xerographic or ink jet technology 
printers. 
One officer noted that it would be useful to search files 
for a character string (full text search), rather than just 
strings in the "subject" field. 
9. Interpretation of Events 
This study is consistent with Laudon's [Laudon 851 model of 
implementation and Bikson's [Bikson 811 set of situational 
characteristics that influence innovation. The original reasons 
for deciding to implement the system were environmental; the 
desire to improve world-wide communications in ID and to put 
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together more competitive deals. The factors that governed the 
success or failure of the implementation were institutional. 
Probably the most important was the visible and unwavering 
support of top management, at least through out the pilot. Key 
actors were involved from the beginning and provided their 
backing. They also manipulated incentives by making it easier 
for their staffs to communicate with them over the system than by 
other means and making it clear that everyone was to enter and 
receive their own messages. 
Another contributing factor was the involvement of users in 
the feasibility study and in the actual implementation. Having a 
respected and dedicated officer from ID playing a key role in the 
implementation resulted in the surfacing of real needs and proper 
weight being given to them during design13. 
These factors alone, while critical, are not sufficient to 
guarantee success. If unwise technical decisions are made or 
decisions based upon inaccurate technical information, then the 
implementation is likely to be compromised. The careful 
technical planning, the scope of the system and its integration, 
the open-ended nature of the architecture that permitted the 
addition and deletion of applications and features, and the 
choice of a reliable mini-computer with a variety of options for 
distributed processing all contributed to the successful pilot. 
1 3 ~ h e  user manager of the pilot was the head of ID. This role 
was delegated to a committee of five, one representative each 
from ID, Asia/Pacific, Middle East/Africa, Auditing and CSD. 
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Environments, however, have a tendency to be dynamic. 
Changing times and markets resulted in shifts in ID'S business. 
Instead of stressing lending and deposit taking, more emphasis is 
being given to non-credit services and intermediary roles. Just 
how OIS fits in with these new endeavors is not clear. This has 
resulted in re-thinking the scope of the system. 
10. Policy Issues Raised by the Study 
This study raises a number of questions concerning 
organizational policy with regard to office automation. 
10.1. Issues 
One major issue raised by OIS is planning for the evolution 
of jobs when there is likely to be significant change or 
replacement. Thought should be given, in advance, as to how 
these jobs should change, for example, identifying new tasks to 
be assumed, providing adequate training and supervision rather 
than allowing this to unfold based on the pragmatics of the 
situation. 
Another issue is what becomes of those secretaries that are 
displaced through improvements in productivity. If the number is 
small then decreasing staff size through attrition is probably 
sufficient. If a larger number were involved, then, some formal 
program of retraining and absorption elsewhere in the company, or 
dismissal would have to be initiated. 
Another issue concerns the company's policy towards work at 
home. OIS allows one to work remotely, by taking a portable 
terminal home or to a hotel room when traveling. This raises 
questions about the need to actually be in the office at all and, 
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at the other extreme, the possibly of exploitation. Will those 
workers that choose not to work at home be penalized? There is 
no indication that, either these issues were considered or, that 
there was pressure to work, after hours, without compensation. 
Security is a potential issue. Although most users were not 
concerned about privacy or security violations, pointing out that 
they currently use open TELEXs and telephones and that OIS is 
certainly more secure than these, IMS is aware of the potential 
for abuse. Care (and the auditors) dictated that none of the 
operational files could be updated from the field. But the 
potential for accessing confidential information remains. 
There are also questions of technology transfer. If one 
configures an office system in the U.S. with the latest 
technology, how much of this can be taken abroad? Then, the 
interference of the Telecommunications Authority in Singapore was 
a concern. Trans-border data flow became an issue in Taiwan and 
it is the reason the system is not installed there. Local 
regulations prohibit the transfer of financial data out of the 
country. The project team was told that the government would 
require an armed soldier standing next to the terminal when it 
was in use. 
Finally, it is not clear what group, at BT, looks at the 
information needs of the whole bank. TD tracks the technology, 
develops application systems as targets of opportunity and does 
some bank-wide information system architectural planning, 
although this latter activity is mostly for the purpose of 
coordinating systems rather than assessing executives information 
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needs. 
10.2. Paradoxes 
The current status of OIS is, to a certain extent, in 
equilibrium. The pilot has been clearly a success. 
Communication in the Asia/Pacific group has improved greatly. 
There is strong user acceptance in the field and in New York. 
Technically and functionally, the system works well. Yet, some 
of the bottom line benefits that were anticipated, for example, 
in closing more deals, have not been achieved. The system was 
"streamlined" after completion of the pilot, as an expense 
savings, by reducing functionality so it could accommodate more 
users on EM, for example, by cutting back on some of the 
administrative office aids and the access to application systems, 
and by reducing the support staff, and then adopted by ID. 
The real payoffs may well come from having the system widely 
used in the bank, so that it serves as a single interface to all 
written material, and this has not occurred. Communications, 
especially overseas has been a problem, which limits the 
usefulness of the system. At certain times the system is heavily 
loaded which affects performance and user satisfaction. It is 
costly to run and separate pricing of services encourages 
discontinuing those that become non-profitable, shrinking the 
coverage and making the system less attractive. 
The integration of the bank's applications into OIS has been 
somewhat half-hearted. In one case the interface to an 
Operations area has been via a terminal located in the corner of 
an office rather than into the main intake stream. If the 
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terminal operator happens to be out that day, messages may not be 
read and and the work requested is not performed. Thus, if an 
answer does not come back in a reasonable amount of time, a 
follow-up phone call is made, although this defeats the purpose 
of the system. In another case, the application is only 
available during working hours in New York (because files are 
being updated by a batch system at other times). This limits 
greatly the usefulness of the particular application in the 
field. Sometimes support for an application is withdrawn without 
a lot of notice (for example, access to the "downtown" reports 
on-line) and people are back to contacting the Operations area 
directly. This confuses them and reduces their incentive to 
learn how to use these interfaces and systems. 
The difficulty appears to be that each interface costs money 
and there has to be strong support and funding from the user 
community before the systems work, programming and procedural 
changes can be made to create a truly integrated operation. This 
is a good example of how the bank's overall strategy of 
controlling non-interest operating expenses and internal expense 
budgeting operate to their disadvantage. By not funding the 
infra-structure directly, the bank has not positioned itself to 
take advantage of office technology in improving operations. 
An argument could be made that, for a bank stressing 
"origination" and "distribution", i.e., investment banking, the 
main benefits of OIS are instantaneous communication world-wide, 
and in this the system has been extremely successful. This 
constrained view of OIS, however, seems shortsighted, as it does 
not explore the potential offered by the technology for improving 
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operational efficiencies (by reducing non-interest or non-risk 
expenses), or for gaining a competitive edge, by, for example, 
allowing direct communication with clients. It is not that the 
bank should use technology for its own sake, but, rather, that 
the bank is acting inconsistently by not being as aggressive in 
this area as they are in marketing their services. 
While the feasibility of OIS has been shown by the pilot, 
the project was in a state of limbo from June 1983 to June 1984, 
at which time it was adopted for all of ID, but with reduced 
functionality and cost (compared with the pilot in Asia/Pacific). 
During this period there was considerable soul searching by 
management, as to whether to go for the full system or one with 
reduced functionality, stressing EM. Several large transaction 
processing systems were in difficulty at this time (cost over-run 
and schedule slippage) compromising the credibility of CSD and 
IMS. In addition, the head of ID was unwilling to risk the 
visibility and organizational upheaval associated with the full- 
function system. 
There are those who felt this was the wrong decision. That 
the system shouldn't have been cut back at this point when real 
benefits were just beginning to be achieved. As one person put 
it, "we are in the dark ages in our use of technology compared to 
other commercial banks and financial institutions. The real 
conflict is between the young turks, the high flyers and the 
bankers, between uptown and downtown, between the front and the 
back office." 
The costs to gain benefits beyond those of improved 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-85-93 
communication are substantial. It implies a commitment to use 
the system, bank wide, as the primary vehicle for written 
communication and information flow. This involves considerable 
expenditures for equipment and support, and overcoming resistance 
in many areas of the bank. It means confronting the conflict 
between the flyers and bankers and breaking down the barrier 
between the front and back offices. This level of commitment is 
a difficult step for a company that has been successful by 
carefully controlling expenses and by not taking unnecessary 
risks. 
Technology is only one component of a business strategy. ID 
is facing a different environment and performing different 
activities now, than they were in June 1982, when the pilot 
started. While the potential of OIS may not have been explored, 
fully, in terms of changes to the content and location of work, 
organizational structure and bottom-line outcomes, executive 
management is in agreement that they couldn't do what they are 
doing today without OIS, unless they hired a lot more people, In 
this regard, the system has clearly been a success. 
10.3. postscript 
Since the time the study was performed, BT has decided to 
offer OIS bank-wide. The responsibility for the system was 
shifted from IMS to a newly formed group, Corporate 
Information/Communication Unit, run from London. The number of 
users on the system has increased and is currently (June 1985) 
close to 800. Modifications to the bank's application systems to 
support access by OIS have been made slowly, but steadily, so 
that many can now be accessed around the clock. OIS is now 
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accepted as the bank's primary office system. 
Significantly, the executive management of Asia/Pacific is 
moving from New York to Hong Kong, a move consistent with the 
bank's philosophy that businesses should be managed locally. OIS 
has definitely contributed to achieving this business goal. It 
is a tribute to OIS that the top people in Asia/Pacific feel 
comfortable enough communicating with their management over the 
system that they are willing to leave New York and the proximity 
to power. 
11, Comparisons with Prior Research 
The results of this study are reasonably consistent with 
those found by other researchers. Hammer's [Hammer 851 
investigation of CitiMail at CitiBank found, similar to this 
study, that the ability to communicate across time zones by 
sending messages out in the afternoon and finding replies waiting 
in the morning was the primary reason for adoption of the system. 
Address lists were constructed of people within CitiBank dealing 
with a particular client and then used to communicate internal 
information pertaining to that client. Thus, CitiMail 
facilitated communication that cut across organizational and 
geographic boundaries. While the initial motivation for starting 
the system was improved international communication, as the 
system matured, the pattern shifted to emphasize local 
communication. 
Support by senior management was also instrumental in staff 
acceptance of the system. Considerable resistance to changing 
established communications patterns was encountered. In order to 
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provide incentives, executive management at CitiBank went so far 
as to use the system to announce key information and important 
organizational changes several hours before some of the material 
was released to the press or made public. They believe that the 
system had an important cultural benefit in exposing many staff 
to computer use, thus reducing their resistance to electronic 
banking. Unexpectedly, considerable resistance was found to the 
use of the 'return receipt' feature. Some staff refused to read 
messages marked with return receipt (they deleted them without 
reading) because they felt this was an invasion of their privacy. 
Hammer found that users tended, on the average, to log on to 
the system twice a day and that a session lasted about 15 
minutes. An average of seven messages were sent per day and ten 
messages received1*. This represented more communication than 
was received by memo, but less than by telephone. Hammer 
observed that messages tended to be limited to one screen with an 
average length of 8 lines (for a sample of 500 messages) and that 
they contained one or two simple ideas. He also noted that the 
messages were less formal than written memos and that the 
sender's personality was often evident. Contrary to the OIS 
study, Hammer did not find substantial substitution of EM for 
either TELEX or telephone traffic, although there was some 
reduction in the rate of their growth. 
Mountgomery et al. [Mountgomery 831  suggest that time zone 
14~his ratio of 1.4 messages received to messages sent was also 
found in the BT OIS and BITS traffic suggesting that it may be a 
constant factor. 
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problems and difficulties in coordination may lead companies to 
experiment with computer based message systems, although this 
study did not consider specifically the TELEX problem. Time zone 
and communications difficulties were two of the main reasons for 
initiation of the OIS pilot in ID. 
Crawford [Crawford 821 found that a pilot group's reaction 
to EM to be "almost universally favorable." He noted that users 
were impressed by the speed and efficiency of non-simultaneous 
communication, and its effectiveness in "broadcasting" 
information to a number of people at the same time. He observed 
that managers felt they were able to accomplish tasks they could 
not otherwise have done, particularly in information exchange and 
distribution. Similar findings occurred in this study. 
This study did not find clerical workers with a more 
specialized and centralized job, as suggested by Olson [Olson 
821. To the contrary, clerical workers appeared to have acquired 
new tasks with more variety and higher level skills than before. 
Not only was much unnecessary work eliminated, but some of the 
routine work (for example, typing) was transferred to others. 
Poppel [Poppel 821 predicts that the use of Office 
Automation technology will have considerable impact on the tasks 
that managers perform and their bottom line performance. The 
findings of this study suggest that these effects may be 
considerably less than suspected. Although the form of tasks 
changed, their content really didn't, nor was there a strong 
bottom line influence. 
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12. Conclusion 
A current theme is that of the 'technological imperative' - 
firms adopt a technology and all sorts of 'good' changes result. 
This study demonstrates the contingent nature and complexity of 
innovation in organizations. In this case, a clear business 
need, top management support, a good technological solution, a 
successful pilot and the best intentions of all parties still did 
not lead to immediate, unqualified acceptance. The project lay 
suspended for a year before a decision was made to move forward 
with a scaled-down version of 01s. It was only after it became 
obvious that the system contributed to the strategic objectives 
of decentralization and re-structuring that it gained momentum. 
Even then, although communications among individuals were greatly 
improved and new 'tools' became available, there was relatively 
little change in the content of jobs or in overall performance as 
a result of 01s. 
Part of the reason for this was the clash of objectives 
among the different players. Part was the difficulty of 
translating goals into programs. Part was simply the inertia of 
large organizations, where the energy behind an idea eventually 
becomes dissipated and the idea languishes. Part was also that 
overall outcomes are the product of many factors. Technology, in 
general, affects only a small number of them. 
This study suggests that one must be cautious in predicting 
the consequences technology will have for workers. There are 
many possibilities and one is tempted, based on individual values 
and the potential inherent in a technology, to sketch an 
enormously broad contour in almost any direction. The trajectory 
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actually taken, however, is influenced by business objectives, 
economics and the situational factors that compose an 
implementation. Consequently, it is likely to fall far short of 
what is possible. People and their organizations are just 
terribly hard to change. 
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Interview Protocol 
1.1. Goals 
The interviews are intended to reveal information about: 
* Job Content: The tasks a person performs in the course 
of a normal day. The responsibilities a person has. 
The authority a person has. The extent a person has 
control over the choice of work methods and pacing. 
The pressure and work load of the job. 
* Structural Arrangements: Formal organizational 
structure. Who one works with. Who one gains 
assistance from and the ease of obtaining it. Who one 
communicates with in 01s. 
* Power: Recent shifts in power. 
* Skill: Changes in skill level. Recent education or 
training programs. 
* Performance: Performance metrics for major work 
products. Productivity. Quality of work products. 
New products. Competition, Industry position. 
* Attitudes about OIS: Likes and dislikes, Functional 
adequacy. Improvements or changes. Attitudes about 
technology. 
* Implementation: Opinions about the implementation 
process. Role played in implementation. Reasons for 
success or failure. 
1 . 2 .  Questions 
1. What is your job at the bank? 
2. When did you begin using OIS? 
3. What do you use OIS for? 
4. About how much time do you spend using OIS in a typical day? 
5. What role, if any, did you play in the implementation of OIS? 
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6. What do you l i k e  bes t  about OIS? 
7. What do you l i k e  least about OIS? 
8. Has OIS met your expectat ions? 
9. Were you t r a ined  i n  OIS? 
10. What do you do when you encounter problems i n  your job? 
11. What do you do when you encounter problems with OIS? 
12. What types of  problems do you encounter with OIS? 
13. What would you change about OIS? 
14. Should OIS be used elsewhere i n  t h e  bank? 
15. Is OIS worth it? ( i n  terms of t h e  c o s t  and t h e  e f f o r t  
t o  use  it.) 
16. Are you concerned about t h e  s e c u r i t y  of  OIS? 
17. How has your job changed over the  last several years? (what 
you do and how you do it.) 
18. How has the  work o f  your col leagues  changed? 
19. Have the re  been any s h i f t s  i n  t h e  number o f  workers i n  your group? 
20. What s h i f t s ,  i f  any, have taken p lace  i n  where t h i n g s  are done, 
e s p e c i a l l y  between the  f i e l d  and t h e  home o f f i c e ?  
21. Has your access  t o  information o r  the  amount o f  time required  
t o  obtained information been a l t e r e d ?  
22. Has the  number of  r e p o r t s  o r  computer output  you r e c e i v e  changed? 
23. How is your performance measured? 
24. Have the re  been any changes i n  t h e  t h e  number o r  q u a l i t y  o f  
the  products  you produce? 
25. Has the re  been any change i n  the  amount o f  c o n t r o l  over t h e  
way you do your job? 
26. Has there  been any change i n  your work load? 
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Glossary 
ACIS 
BITS 
BT 
BT AL 
BTNe t 
BTShare 
CSD 
CSO 
DEC 
DECNET 
EM 
FA IS 
HR 
ID 
IMS 
I RMD 
MPS 
01s 
ROE 
TD 
TISCO 
TSO 
V AX 
VDT 
VMS 
WP 
- Automated Competitor Intelligence System 
- Bankers Trust International TELEX System 
- Bankers Trust Company 
- Bankers Trust subsidiary located in Australia 
- Bankers Trust private telecommunications network 
- Bankers Trust internal timesharing system 
- Computer Systems Department 
- Customer Service Officer 
- Digital Equipment Corporation 
- Telecommunications software for DEC computers 
- Electronic Mail 
- Financial Asset Inventory System 
- Historical Research System 
- International Department 
- Information Management Services 
- International Risk Management and Credit Review 
- Monthly Profitability System 
- Office Information System 
- Return on average common equity 
- Technology Department 
- Bankers Trust subsidiary located in Bangkok 
- IBM time shared operating system 
- DEC computer 
- Video display terminal 
- DEC operating system for VAX computers 
- Word processing 
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